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OsLo's SuccEss, A MILITARIZED 
RESISTANCE: CHANGING OPPOSITION 
TACTICS IN THE PALESTINIAN 
TERRITORIES 
Anne Marie Baylouny 
INTRODUCTION 
Iv; the United States embarks on an ongoing relationship with Iraq and the 
resistance movements there, it would do well to learn frotn other experiences 
in dealing with opposition groups. The case of Israel in the Palestinian terri-
tories provides a powerful lesson in which seemingly sound military tactics 
led to an increase in radicalization, not pacification, of the resistance. 
A recurring obstacle in policy formation is the persistence in viewing 
resistance actions, including Islamist ones, as centrally directed and hierarchi-
cally organized. Whereas some may fall into this category, most movements 
are highly decentralized. Policymakers are surprised when, after assassinating 
the organization's leaders, the movement not only persists but fights back 
harder. Equating the opposition with, and attributing all responsibility to, its 
elite leaders has led to an incorrect evaluation of the causes and dynamics of 
the resistance itself, and yielded flawed policies to moderate these move-
n1ents. 
The trajectory of resistance movements in Palestine in the 1990s demon-
strates that militarization beconllng a fundamental characteristic and strategy 
of the conflict was not a foregone conclusion. Continued collective repres-
sion, combined with divide-and-conquer p~pulation control policies, which 
are embodied in Oslo, has made both the Palestinian territories and Israel less 
secure. In this chapter, I advance theories of repression and undergrou11d 
movements using social movement theory, and use the experience of 
Palestinian opposition groups since the 1993 Oslo accords to demonstrate 
factors promoting its militarization. Pron1oting t11e decentralization and 
fragmentation of a domestically based movement will not lead to the dis-
n1antling of the n1ovement as Jong as the underlying issues re1nain. Instead, 
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frag1nentation n1ay create a situation of continuing n1ilitary insecurity and an 
increase in violence. 
It is generally acknowledged that the Oslo peace accords between Palestine 
and Israel have failed, and this failure is oti:en viewed as causing the radicaliza-
tion of opposition groups. I argue the opposite. The very implementation of 
Oslo's provisions constituted one n1ajor cause for the militarization of the 
resistance. Oslo entailed the repression of dissent, the removal of the masses 
from the organized opposition, the targeting of Islamist and secular leaders, 
and the extreme fragmentation of the resistance. Fundamental to the Oslo 
process is the frag1nentation of the territories and continued Israeli control of 
exit points. These policies, perhaps premised on a false conception of security 
for Israel through disarming the Palestinian opposition, have resulted in the 
opposite: the decentralization and fragmentation of resistance created compe-
tition, as local resistance groups were cut-off from both their leadership and a 
larger public constituency. Therefore, their actions were w1hindered by any 
source of accountability as the struggle for movement leader raised the bar for 
activists. 
My theoretical conclusions regarding the dynamics of decentralization in 
resistance movements are tested on two groups of the Palestinian resistance. 
The case of the Palestinian group Fatail, in particular, accords with my expec-
tations. The more fragmented and leader-less the resistance group, the higher 
the level of anarchy, independent decision-making, abrogation of agreed-upon 
truces, and internal battles for dominance. Often, such battles are characterized 
by the use of bold military maneuvers in order to establish and instinitionalize 
a new leadership. In decreasing order of fragmentation, the groups are Fatail's 
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. Hamas is currently the 
most disciplined and hierarchical of the movements. Farah's al-Aqsa Brigades 
was relieved ofits middle leadership in approximately 2002, from which time 
autonomous tendencies increased substantially. If tl1e current wave of assassi-
nation of Hamas leadership continues, the future of tl1at group will likely 
resemble the current anarchy in Fatah. 
On a proactive note, tl1is study yields policy prescriptions designed to 
moderate domestic-based conflicts. 1 An analysis of the causes for growing 
n1ilitancy in the Palestinian resistance provides ll1sight into movement 
dynamics in other locations, which will hopefully lead to policies effectively 
deterring further militarization. Instead of treading the bloody path oflsrael, 
the United States has the ability to learn from those mistakes. I argue that the 
hierarchical leadership of resistance movements should be left in place, and 
popular nonviolent social 1novements encouraged. Population control poli-
cies designed to fragment the opposition are counterproductive} as they lead 
to an exit of much of the general population from the movement. It is this 
popular involve1nent that can n1oderate resistance actions, provided nonvio-
lent protest and organizing is allowed. 
I start by analyzing the provisions of the Declaration of Principles, n1ore 
co111monly kt10\vn as the Oslo accords, and the Israeli perspective of obtall1-
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of the dynamics of terroris1n and underground n1oven1ents in the context of 
policies of repression and decentralization, policies contained in the accords 
and part of Israel's security concept. Finally, I trace the tin1eline of the 
Palestinian resistance from the first Intifada through the militarization of the 
opposition in Oslo, analyzing how policies intended to increase security for 
Israel worked in the opposite direction. I conclude with policy implications 
that arise from this study for reducing the violent wings of grassroots oppo-
sition movements. 
THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE ON THE ACCORDS: 
SECURITY AS CONTROL 
The Declaration of Principles was negotiated in Oslo, Norway, and was 
signed in September 1993 in Washington, D.C., by Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak 
Rabin, with President Bill Clinton presiding. 3 Initially, many hailed the Oslo 
accords as a solution to the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over a 
decade later, however, Oslo's timetable has not been nlet. It is this failure that 
is generally held responsible for the increased violence by opposition groups 
in the West Bank and Gaza strip. The common interpretation is that Hamas 
and other militarized Islamist groups emerged out of "frustration" with the 
Jack of progress in negotiations. The assumption is tlmt if Oslo had been fully 
iinplemented, societal opposition and violent rebellion would not occur. 
If Oslo \Vas meant to bring peace to Israel via the creation of a Palestinian 
state, it has indeed failed. However, those goals were not in the Oslo accords. 
The aim was an open-ended process whose n1ain and concrete provision \Vas 
the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority. Oslo 
entailed a piecemeal process by which a Palestinian authority would gain par-
tial control over increasingly more land. The substance of tl1is land transfer 
was to be negotiated in interim agreements, none of which dealt with "final 
status" issues or the ultimate fate of the territo1ies: v.1ater control, borders, 
and refugees, amidst otl1ers. The end game was left undecided. 
Much has been made of tl1e ambiguity of the Oslo treaties, the power dis-
crepancy embodied in tl1e agreements, and the many subjects they leave 
unresolved. Nonetheless, from an objective perspective, to a large extentl 
Oslo has been enacted. Intermediate transfers of authority to the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) have certainly gone beyond the stated timetable. The result is 
a drastically, radically altered landscape of the West Bank and Gaza.4 
Palestinians hoped that Oslo would lead 'to an independent state, but 
Israel's primary goal was security. That security was obtained through the 
accords in two ways: first, through n1ilitary policing policies, and second 
through population control policies such as checkpoints. Through these 
means, twin goals were achieved that the Israelis presun1ed would thwart vio-
lent resistance. Formal opposition organizing of all types, including peaceful 
forms, was officially prevented and repressed, and existing opposition groups 
were fragn1ented and forced underground, effectively inhibiting the fi.1nc-
tioning of group hierarchies. 
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Military policing fi1nctions arc clear in Oslo. The Palestinians agreed to 
bear responsibility for the suppression of Islamist groups and all dissent, and 
Israeli withdra\\'als \Vere conditional on Palestinian ability to n1eet Israel's 
security needs. Indeed, one of Oslo's lew clear stipulations is the creation of 
a Palestinian police force to enforce internal order.5 A "strong Palestiniai1 
police force" fOr this purpose is repeatedly n1entioned in the accords. That 
tOrce 110\v nun1bers about 40,000. Even so, Israel retained the right to 
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intervene in areas under the authority of the Palestinians (areas "A") \Vhen 
security justified it. This notion of security included protection of Israeli set-
tlers in the occupied territories. 
Oslo expanded· and legitimized Israel's supervision of popuh1tio11 1nove-
1nents, resulti11g in a ''matrix of control. "6 The tiny West Bank, s1naller than 
Delaware, is currently fragn1ented into 300 separate areas as shown in n1ap 4.1. 7 
Measures designed to exercise control over population n1oven1cnts were var-
iously coded in tl1e accords as econon1ic, bureaucratic, or den1ographic. The 
accords increased t11e nun1ber of borders, checkpoints, and the use of closure 
or refosing Palestinian workers entry to Israel. As per Oslo II, the responsi-
bility for the security of all Palestinian borders would rest with Israel.8 
''Borders" beca1ne internal borders, including exit or entry fro1n any areas 
transferred to the PA. In effCct, the occupied territories beca1nc a patch\vork 
of small areas under the control of the PA, surrounded by borders that Israel 
had the right to police. 
Oslo involved planned, partial withdrawals from land in the West Bank and 
Gaza, which would then come under the PA's rule. These were termed areas 
"A." The Israeli military would be redeployed from these areas and be sta-
tioned outside them. Areas B and C would remain in Israeli hands during the 
initial phases of Oslo. By the end of 1999, the PA was in control of over 200 
s1nall areas-most of then1 smaller than one square 111ile.9 Passage to or ffom 
them was controlled by Israeli military checkpoints. Border controls and phys-
ical barriers, such as trenches, electric fences, and barricades of sand, rock, or 
concrete, lie outside each of these areas. Additionally, roads in the territories 
are policed by numerous standing and mobile checkpoints, the latter termed 
"flying checkpoints" due to their lack of a permanent location. In the fast fr)ur 
years, over 500 new military checkpoints have been established.'" A 
Palestinian going fron1 one area of the PA in the north, Jenin, to another in 
the south, Hebron, would have to pass through 50 such border crossings. 11 
Further bisecting the territories is a grid of bypass roads, linking the 
settlen1ents to Israel but insulating them ffom tl1e surrounding Palestinian 
population. Unlike the Palestinian traveler mentioned above, Israelis trnvel 
fi·eely throughout the territories, via bypass roads, \Vithout ever changing 
zones or being held up at a checkpoint. According to a nien1ber of the 
Knesset, settlements were purposely located in the midst of densely popu-
lated Palestinian areas in order to prevent territorial integrity for the PA and 
thus any possibility of a Palestinian state. 12 The confiscation of land to build 
these roads was approved by Oslo ll,13 and the Hebron protocol served as an 
exen1plar to justify positioning Israeli settlen1ents in the 1niddle of Palestinian 
population centers. 14 
The \Vall that Israel is currently constructing is another 111eans of segregating 
Israel fron1 the Palestinians. Like the bypass roads and scttle111cnts, it incor-
porates Palestinian land, de facto, into Israeli control and cuts villages ofT 
from each other and fron1 their agricultural lands. Sixteen Palestinian villages 
are caught behveen t11e wall and the official Israeli border, isolated not only 
fi·on1 Israel but tl-0111 the rest of the West Bank as \Vell. 15 
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Closure is a forther element of population control in Oslo. Closure is 
defined as limitations imposed by Israel on the movement of the Palestinian 
population and its goods. Closure can be internal, \Vithin the West Bank and 
Gaza strip; external; or between those territories and Israel. It can be partial or 
total. 16 Whereas closure predates Oslo and the advent of suicide bombings 
inside Israel, it was institutionalized by the accords and presented as an 
antiterrorisn1 measure. 17 Internal closure is effectively a curfew, preventing 
n1ove1nent between villages. Closure combines \Vith the pass or permit syste1n, 
whereby even when restlictions are lifi:ed the population needs permission to 
move from place to place. 18 
Curfews are closely linked to closure, and serve as yet one n1ore method 
tOr controlling population move1nent. In those areas remaining under Israeli 
control (B and C), curfews were enacted throughout the Oslo process. 
Further, if Israel deems that the PA fails to meet Israel's security concerns, 
area A could come under curfew also. This last provision was used as a rationale 
for the al-Aqsa or second Intifada. 19 
These measures accord with the Israeli military's basic premise for interacting 
with the Palestinian population. Indeed, the military had a hand in Oslo, one 
that was more pronounced in Oslo II, and it viewed the agreements as fitlfill-
ing Israel's security requireinents.2° For Israel, security consists of preventing 
attacks or deterrence. Deterrence is achieved through the demonstration of 
1nilitary superiority, communicating the futility of resistance. Disproportionate 
nillitary responses to real or alleged security threats are an integral part of this 
deterrence. Retaliating with overwhehning force was tern1ed "escalation dom-
inance," as stated by Moshe Dayan; it was believed to deter fonire attacks by 
raising the cost of Israeli blood to a level untenable for the Palestinians or 
enemy popnlations.21 In the beginning of the second Intifada, the Israeli mili-
tary acted with disproportionate force, since they believed their mistake in the 
first Intifada was initially responding without enough strength, thus not com-
municating sufficient resolve and force.22 This policy has remained central to 
Israeli military philosophy and relations with the Palestinians.23 
Oslo embodied the Israeli military solution for insurgent populations: 
demonstrating 111.ilitary superiority and deterring resistance activities. The 
Oslo regime provides a daily display oflsrael's overwhelming military power 
through population control. Closures, per111its, checkpoints, and curfews 
serve as an ongoing "shock and awe" program. These policies are meant to 
increase frustratio11 among the Palestinian population, convincing them of 
the !Utility of defeating the Israeli military. 24 The population, in turn, would 
theoretically compel the fighters to cease their attacks. The population must 
have the will and capacity to force the insurgents or protesters to stop.25 
However, Oslo prevents the populace from being able to play such a role. 
The separation of the population into fragmented and separ.1te terlitolies is 
believed to enhance deterrence. Thus the parcellization of terlitory accords with 
Israeli security doctrine, which ain1s to prevent actions by others, rather than 
work to\vard direct n1ilitary conquest. 26 The location of Israeli settlen1ents has 
both political and military goals. In addition to the political goal of preventing 
' .. -
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a contiguous Palestinian state, placing settlements in densely populated 
Palestmtan areas also mcreases the presence of the Israeli Defense Forces. This 
provides 1nore opportunities to thwart n1ilitary advances or even the organizing 
of Palestinian forces, preventing insurgency. In addition, it creates ne'v borders 
~o police, red lines whose crossing signals international (pri1narily An1ericai1) 
J~stificati~~ for retaliati?.n. This ~s particularly in1portant since securing interna-
tlonal legitlmacy for military actlons ranks high in Israeli calculations, more so 
than domestic considerations. 27 
DECENTRALIZED MOBILIZING AND COMPETITION 
Israeli ~olicy ~ests on collective punishment, popular frustration, and physical 
separat10n to impede the organizing capability of the populace. Ultimately, so 
the theory goes, the Palestinians should realize that opposition cannot suc-
ceed, and give up. 
Clearly, the pacification expected by the Israelis has not occurred. Instead, 
?slo has .res.ulted in the radicalization and n1ilitarization of the opposition, an 
111crease 10 msurgency~ and more attacks on Israelis. Why? Is it because, as 
Israel maintains, the opposition is part of a well-organized and directed chal-
lenge, which neither Arafat nor his successors acted to prevent, or indeed, has 
encouraged and led? If that were the case, increased enforcement of the 
above measures would be calJed for: nlore separation between Israelis and 
Palestinians and collt:ctive punishments. 
The evidence fron1 cases world\vide demonstrates that the tactics 
empl'."yed by Israel should be expected to increase, ratl1er than end, the polit-
ical violence _of the resistance.28 The radicalization of the opposition during 
the Os!~ per'.od an~ the second Intifada is due, in part, to policies pushing 
groups mto mcreasmgly decentralized organizing, while at the same time 
exacerbating tl1e underlying g1ievances and causes of opposition. 29 
Numerous Israeli-Oslo policies caused the decline of mass popular par-
ticipation, including the inability to move freely or gather together. Oslo's 
provisions inhibited organization and freedon1 of association 'vhich 
rem~ved the popular character of tl1e opposition and forced the re;naining 
actlv1sts to work underground in decentralized cells. Prohibitions, harsh 
penalties for organizing, and increased difficulties of convening n1eetings 
caused the exodus of most classes from organized resistance. Closure has 
~ln1?st co1npl:tely hindered all forms of involvement and co1nmunity partic-
1pat1on and, 111 many cases, even the ability to \Vork. Increased cconon1ic 
hardshi.p, repression, and the lack of public space created by Oslo's frag-
mentatlon of the terntory all decreased the ability and willingness of the 
populace to becon1e involved in the opposition. These sa1ne mechanisn1s 
diminished the levers of political control and hierarchy within opposition 
groups. Further, the nature of the PA itself added to the dissociation of the 
co1nmunity fion1 forn1al organizing. Con1ing ffom outside the territories 
the PA \Vanted to establish a governing base independent of the indigenou~ 
leaders developed in the Intifada. It did so by drawing on old traditional 
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elites and its o\vn street cadres. The n1iddle class and popular leadership, 
which organized dcn1ocratically, were marginalized. . 
Economic hardship, caused by closure, has exacerbated these tendencies 
by reducing the number of individuals available for protest actions. The 
increase in poverty which resulted from closure is not directly responsible for 
the radicalization of the opposition.30 The poor are not the mainstay of 
organized oppositions, even in suicide actions, and are, in any case, too busy 
trying to survive to participate in such organizations. 31 
Theories of Popular Mobilization 
Policies to inhibit mobilizing are based on the premise that these movements 
are hierarchical, controlled by a leader who commands his followers. Without 
the leader, tlle reasoning goes, the masses would be either unable or unwill-
ing to act. One theorist calls this the "n1icrowave" theory of political 
violence. The leader pushes a button, and militancy is turned on or off.32 
However, the difficulty of formal organizing more often leads to decentral-
ized and underground activities, not to the disappearance of the organization 
as top-down theories of opposition suggest. 
What happens when a moven1ent becomes exclusive and fragmented? 
Accountability and n1oderation suffer, and violence increases. The remaining 
small groups of activists move underground to survive, becoming isolated 
fron1 the influence of the com1nunity and imn1une to external factors. 
Without a social base to consider, the movement is liberated from the con-
straint of maintaining the good will of the masses. 33 Cut off from outside 
contacts, they become trapped within underground "spirals of encapsulation," 
which diminish the potential of outside ideologies, ideas, and individuals to 
alter activists' vie\vs.34 Such isolation, or segregation fron1 the object of their 
resistance, is key to the creation of oppositional consciousness. For this, 
autonomous spaces where the move1nent can develop without ties of affec-
tion, friendship, or business are necessary to promote more radical views.35 
Integration spoils this oppositional consciousness. Insulation from alternative 
opuuons or practices has been instrumental in creating loyal men1bers for 
cults. 36 In the extre1ne, as is the case in exclusive and underground organiz-
ing, separation promotes "anti-system" ideologies, a process that has led to 
violence against civilians in Algeria. 37 
Violence is most prominent when the n1ajority of the movement has eitl1er 
integrated into the establishment or disbanded. The relationship between num-
bers and the use of violence in protest activities is inverse: the more people, the 
less violence is necessary to demonstrate corn1nitment to the goals of the move-
ment. The nlajority, in any moven1ent, is unwilling to engage in violence, and 
this logic is behind tlle democratic regulation of social movements. Once dan-
ger exists, 1nost participants exit, leaving behind only those most committed. 
As numbers dwindle, the need to make a big statement remains. During 
Italy's period of social activisn1 and terrorisn1, it was the groups that lacked 
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specialized in violence, a cheap and available resource not requiring much 
coordi~ation. Without the necessary numbers to con1n1unicatc such a n1essage, 
more violent 111ethods arc used to achieve the desired result. Violence indi-
rectly aids the cause through publicity, demonstrating the credibility and 
co1n1nitn1ent of the protesters, \vhich adds legitimacy to their cause, recruiting 
n1embers by being the n1ost active organization in the field, keeping 1nen1-
bers in line and con1mitted, and provoking a response that polarizes the sides, 
tOrcing previously neutral individuals to take a stand.3R 
Organization and bureaucratization tend to nloderate n1ovc111cnts, both 
by subjecting members to a hierarchy of authority and through the 
constraining influences of the majority. Arguably, this pushes formal organi-
zations toward greater acceptance of the status quo. Theorists of the poor 
bemoan the co-optation and pacification of social movements through the 
est~blishment of formal organizations. In particular, the use of disruptive 
act:Ions decreases, sit1ce the organization incorporates various classes: 
the middle, which has an aversion to violence; and the leadership, witl1 an 
interest in becoming part of the "reputable" establishment. 
What if the community itself approves of the use of violence? Currently a 
1najority of Palesti11ians condone continuing n1ilitary operations \\'ithin 
Israel. 39 In this case, too, formal organizing moderates the n1ove1nent. The 
community may condone the actions of the few who take violent action but , 
it is unwilling to engage in or take responsibility for those acts, In addition, 
organizational dynamics themselves mitigate against violence. 
Violence is problematic for the stability of organizations. The practical 
organizational need for resources and n1oney li1nits the an1ount of anti-
establishn1ent and disruptive activities.40 Organizations are fragile and 
resource dependent. In order to survive, they must incorporate various 
classes with access to necessary resources, including money, net\vorks, access 
to elites and influential individuals, and meeting locations. The middle pro-
fessional and business classes are usually involved-classes with concrete, 
tangible h1terests, which can easily be threatened by negative repercus-
sions fi_-om the authorities. Organizations institutionalize decision-n1aking 
processes, spreading responsibility for the organization's actions ;.unong the 
membership. Formal organizations incorporate hierarchical control and 
adherence to tlle decisions of the leadership, factors that moderate group 
activities. 
Leaderships not only aut11orize but also constrain resistance activities. In 
Han1as, as in 1nost Islamist move1nents, political wings are separate fro1n n1il-
itary branches, and political approval is required betOre operations arc 
authorized. Leaders not only authorize but also prohibit operations. 
Subjecting the military to political constraints has the potential to moderate 
the movement \Vith practical considerations. Nun1erous cease-tires have been 
enacted by Hamas leaders. Only leaders popularly recognized as authorities 
~re ~ble. to pledge their n1oven1ent's con11nitment to a deal. Since the organ-
1zat:ton is not fortnal, leadership depends on accepted authority. In Lebanon, 
the use of suicide bombing by Hizballah was subject to the approval of the 
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clerical leadership. After the Israeli withdraw<tl in 1985, leaders proclaimed an 
end to the use of the tactic, with rare exceptions. 41 
Further, leaderships are subject to the requisites of public opinion in their 
constituency, which can act as a brake on violent n1oven1ent activities. The 
con1munity \Vas able to perforn1 this function in Egypt, for exa1nple. Popular 
outrage against the killing of tourists in November 1997 by al-Gama'a 
al-Islamiyya convinced the leadership of that group to amend its ideological 
stance and strategy, effectively ending the violence. 42 Israeli policies of collec-
tive punishment rely on the co111n1unity to rein in the activists. To do this, the 
populace must have-the will and capacity to deter the insurgents or protesters. 
By severing the link between the con1munity and the activists, decentralization 
prohibits the community from performing this moderating function. 
The absence of leaders able to command the respect and adherence of 
movement tOllowers means that con1munity influence is not felt on activists. 
An extreme example is the international Islamist group al Qaeda, which is 
divorced fro1n any don1estic or co1nn1unity connections, and therefore 
accountability. Similarly, externally based leaderships are less moderating, 
since they too lack the consideration of a social base in constraining their 
decisions. Domestic-based leaderships are the most moderating and accom-
modating to political opportunities. This is clear in Hamas. The external 
leadership in Jordan and the decentralized cells are both more radical and 
willing to use violence than the domestic leadership. 
Israeli policy is expanding on Oslo's decentralizing tendencies by syste1n · 
atically eliminating the resistance leadership. This opens the field for potential 
leadership battles, characterized by a competition of one-upmanship. 
Competition is an in1portant factor in violent protest actions. Co1npetition 
within a social moven1ent among various groups with similar goals, for example, 
led to high amounts of violence during Italy's experience with terrorism. 
Violent acts are advertisements that distinguish one group from the rest. 
Increased use of violence occurs when nun1erous grot1ps \vith like goals exist, all 
vying for prominence and social support.43 In the extreme, would-be leaders 
attempt to outdo each other through demonstrating their ability to imple-
1nent ever more daring acts. 
The dynamics outlined here hold when the underlying issues remain 
unaddressed, or indeed those problems are exacerbated, as is the case in the 
West Bank and Gaza strip. Grassroots support will continue to feed the oppo-
sition in such a case. In the Palesti11ian territories, ongoing collective repres-
sion and general punishment have effectively renewed and strengthened the 
commitment to the fight. The opposition in the West Bank and Gaza has 
more volunteers for suicide operations than it can 11andle. 44 It is they who 
seek out the organizations. Recruit1nent plays a n1arginal role.45 
Repression, particularly indiscriminate repression applied to all witl1out 
regard to whether they participated in opposition activities or not, is by itself 
powerfully linked to tl1e militarization of opposition movements and the forma-
tion of broad revolutionary coalitions against the reigning authorities. 
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increases the likelihood of violent protest. Violence is legitimized as the only 
" t"46 B ·1 · d ! \Vay ou . y contrast, nonVIo ent options are epenc ent upon the response of 
the authorities: if the authority is not bound by "universalistic moral principles, n 
th~n such action is \vorthless. The government remains unlitnited in the range 
of Its responses, and can merely eliminate the protesters.47 
In a democracy, repression of unla\vful activities will channel niost of the 
group into lawful pursuits. In contexts \Vhere no 111obilizing is allo\ved, 
repression \vill, over time, create more violent actions on the part of the 
group. Whereas Israel is a den1ocracy, the occupied territories are not. 
Freedon1 of peaceful association is not a right in either the territories under 
Israeli or PA control. 
Despite the predominance of militarized protest and substantial public 
support for it, nonviolent possibilities are not dead. Clearly nonviolent 
demonstrations are logistically more ditlicult than previously, as less public 
space is available to mobilize, network, and stage protests. Still, nonviolent 
actions are discussed, debated, and undertaken. Generally, however, they are 
neither reported by the media nor do their participants escape (Israeli) military 
or (Palestinian) police action. There is a \videspread opinion that nonviolent 
protest, although desirable in theory, will only result in slaughter for the par-
ticipants, effectively removing the masses from such participation.48 This 
opinion is backed by experience, as nonviolent demonstrations have been 
met with lethal force by both the PA and lsrael.49 Advocates and organizers 
of nonviolent activities end up in jail alongsi<.te those engaging in violence, 
even metnbers of organizations uniting Israeli Je"'s and Palestinians. For 
exan1ple, a leader of such a demonstration was placed under adn1inistrative 
detention since, according to authorities, he \Vas embarking on an 
"unhappy" path.50 Thousands of Palestinian political prisoners on a hunger 
strike, similarly, found their effort did not seen1 to "'arrant 111edia coverage or 
draw attention to the conditions they were protesting. An Israeli otlkial 
likened the hunger strike to terror, saying he would not give in to their 
demands. 51 Explicitly in reference to the lack of attention to this nonviolent 
action, armed groups declared their desire to kidnap soldiers and settlers to 
promote the prisoners' demands.52 A demonstration in which An1ericans and 
Israeli Jews participated \Vas greeted by live fire. 53 Another nonviolent 
demonstration, declared free of weapons by Amnesty International, held to 
dra\v attention to the plight of the Rafah rcfllgee can1p under curfi.:,v, \Vas 
attacked by four tank shells, killing eight. 54 
Populations do rebel against more powerful authorities. Jeff Goodwin 
states that political exclusion and repression, not econo111ic exploitation or 
poverty, explain tl1e revolutionary moven1ents that took place throughout 
the Cold War. 55 It is only states that were particularly closed politically, 
and excessively repressive, that faced broad revolutionary niovements. 
Insurgencies will be popularly supported where the authorities have abused 
~ivilians in. a random fashion. Continuing and increasing repression and polit-
ical exclusion, Goodwin concludes, will most likely give rise to revolutionary 
movements. 
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Oslo's policies achieved the end desired in Isr.icli security doctrines. The_ 
cumulative etTect has been to increase ffustration, hu111iliation, and feelings of 
injustice an1ong the Palestinians. However, they have not led to surrender or 
pacification. Nor should they be expected~(). In oth~r contexts,_such ef~ects 
have been crucial in creating a broad base of commuruty support for rebellion. 
Senses of injustice and victin1ization provide tacit con1n1unity approval f?r 
militarization by creating oppositional consciousness, a mental state that facil-
itates protest actions against a 111ore po\verfi1I opponent. Frustration and 
' l I . I ' 6 ~~righteous" anger ti1c t us 1nenta state: . 
Although Israeli doctrine presumes that frustration should result m a rnld 
calculation that insurgency is pointless and should therefore cease'. only nots 
and crowd violence have been associated with frustration in the social analysis 
of protest." In older crowd analyses, rational thought and action were 
believed to be inhibited by an increase in frustration among the populace. 
Whether frustration is in fact behind such events is questionable, but the 
en1otions involved have not been linked \Vi th passivity or surrender. 58 
Failure to grasp the essential grassroots nature of the opposition and the 
broad support fOr its activities has been the inistake of n1any governments. 
Within a context of general support fOr opposition activities, decentralization 
of a 1nove1nent \vill not end it, but only exacerbate the characteristics found 
in underground and exclusive organizations. If, in fact, the underlying 
rationale is addressed, or when the populace is provided a political opportu-
nity to participate in for1nal institutions, pushing th: fe\v ren1aining holdouts 
underground can tcrn1inate the violent n1ove1nent itself. 
THE PALESTINIAN OPPOSITION: FROM 
MASSES TO MILITARIZATION 
This section tests the theory outlined above against the chronology of oppo-
sition organizing from the first through second Intifada, It concentrates o:° 
two groups, Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawima al-Islanuyya-the Isla~ic 
Resistance Movement) and Fatal1 (Harakat al-Tahm al-Wataruyya 
al-Falastiniyya-Movement for the National Liberati?n of Palestine), '.he 
main religious and secular opposition groups, respectively. Dunng the hrst 
Intifada, the popular character of organizll1g, incorporating multtple classes 
of society, was directly responsible for the (relatively) nonviolent character ?f 
that uprising, 59 The progressive fragmentation of hierarchical autl1onty m 
Fata11, and the increasing anarchy in that moven1ent, resulted 1~ less security 
for people in both Israel and Palestine, Fatah 's lack of org~nizat1on~l cont~ol 
\Vas partially caused by the territorial ffagmentation an~ anti-leadership poltc1es 
of Oslo. The predicament ofFatah demonstrates the tuture we can expect for 
Hamas, should these policies continue. To a large degree, and Ha.mas has to 
date maintained discipline in its ranks, Sucl1 hierarchical control should be 
recognized as a situation to be encouraged; frag1~1en~ation in a r~sis~a?ce 
movement ,vith \Videspread support will increase tts violence and 1nh1b1t a 
conclusion to the conflict. 
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The First Intifada 
The first Intifada, beginning at the end of 1987, was a time of massive popu-
lar organizing involving all sectors of society. Particularly evident \Vas the 
participation of \vo1nen and child_ren. A ne~· 111obilizing infrastructure 
emerged, revolving around democratic local co1nn1ittces and a rotating lead-
ership comprising all the political factions, Strictly speaking, the Intifada was 
not nonviolent; however, its violence \Vas lin1itcd to the thro\ving of sto11es 
against the Israeli nlllitary, not civilians. The n1ain \vcapons \Vere econo1nic: 
the boycotting of Israeli con1111odities and taxes, and con1n1crcial strikes. 
Stores closed as n1erchants joined the Intifada, refi.1sing to open or to sell 
Israeli goods, 
This was not the first time tl1e population protested. It had been doing so 
for years. But previous demonstrations, protests, and strikes had ended. In 
the period from 1977 to 1982, an average of 500 such protest events took 
place per year. From I 982 to the start of the uprising, the average was 
between 3,000 and 4,000 per year.60 The first Intifada saw popular organiz-
ing reach a new stage by daily strikes encon1passing all areas of t11e territories. 
The self-perpetuating nature of this uprising was possible due to the devel-
opment of a new organizational infrastructure. A ne\v 111iddle class and pro-
fessional leadership, including 1ncrchants, created a net\vork of con1n1ittees 
that provided support for everytlling from education to health care. 
Committees ran and decided all types of actions, from strike days to the pro-
vision of t:ducation, since schools \Vere closed by Israel. Esti1nates suggest 
that tens of thousands of committees \Vere established, including those 
tOcused on food storage, security, health and medical relief, and agriculture. 
The first Intifada had created a new leadership infn>structure in the terri-
tories. The Intifada itself came as a surprise to the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) leadership outside tlle territories: they were politely 
"informed" of UNLU (United National Leadership of the Uprising) 
decisions; their pennission was requested for den1onstration events usually 
after the £1ct. Instead, up-and-coming personalities took control, subjecting 
their decisions to popular consent. The democratic and popular character of 
the Intifada demonstrated this, with prominent roles played by women, 
children, and even the elderly, 
The leadership of the uprising was organized through the UNLU. UNLU 
members were young, educated, lower and middle social strata. The leader-
ship was rotating, providing a steady flow of new leaders. They mediated 
quarrels, made binding decisions and in1posed' fines, announced den1onstra-
tions and strikes, and issued con1muniques on behalf of the uprising. 61 
Hamas participated in the first Intifada along with other groups, and 
gained popularity due to its nationalist activities.62 Han1as began as an off-
shoot of the Muslin1 Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories, an organi-
zation that had been conciliatory or passive to\vard the Israeli occupation 
until the first Intifada began in Dece111ber 1987. Han1as was created in 
order to not lose the public, \Vhich \Vas fast den1anding active opposition to 
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the occupation.63 At this point, the group's nlilitary \Ying conducted 
occasional operations against Israeli soldiers and tnilitary targets, but not 
against civilians.64 
Repression by the Israeli authorities merely increased the level ofprotest.65 
The Israeli n1ilitary govern111ent's atte1npt to keep stores open by fOrce 
backfired, solidifying the merchants' support for the Intifuda. Defense 
Minister Rabin later adn1itted that trying to tbrce con1mercial stores to open 
was the biggest mistake made at that time.66 The merchants added needed 
credibility and organizational and financial resources to the uprising. 
The Peace Process and Arafat's Return 
The Intifada led to the Madrid conference, a negotiating process involving all 
parties to the conflict, sponsored by President George H.W. Bush after Gulf 
War I. The Palestinian parties to the conference \Vere unaware, as was every· 
one else, of Arafat's intermediaries negotiating directly in Oslo, Norway. The 
premise of the Madrid conference was that negotiations to solve the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict needed to involve the countries ueighboring Israel and those 
that hosted Palestinian refi.tgees. This process was abruptly halted when it was 
announced that Arafat and Rabin had reached an agreement. The news took 
the Palestinian negotiators in Washington, DC, by surprise. Within days, 
Arafat arrived in the capital, shook Rabin's hand on the White House lawn, 
and tliey agreed to recognize each other. 
The Declaration of Principles between the two sides effectively ended the 
Intifada. The Palestinian community was split on the merits of the agree-
1nent: those in the West Bartle and Gaza \Vere n1ainly in tavor, those in the 
diaspora in tlie Arab countries were against. The Palestinian leaders found it 
hard to object to being upstaged by such a revered leader, whose name 
became equated with the Palestinian cause internationally and who had pub-
licized tlte little-known cause until it had become widely recognized. Some 
leaders did express disapproval. As time went by, more moved into the criti-
cal opposition against the PLO, which by this time had become the PA. 
However, for the first few years, even Han1as could not re1nain opposed to 
the new situation, or again risk being out of step \vith its public support and 
losing its constituency. 
Arafat could not enter and rule over this existing it1digenous inffastruc-
ture: the new leadership created by the first Intifada would not acquiesce to 
be ruled in the style of a dictator. Their resistance, after all, had established 
the most democratic institutions in the Arab world during the uprising. They 
earned street credentials, popular legitimacy based on their own personal suf-
fering tOr the cause, tin1e spe11t in prison, and leadership abilities. But to build 
a centrally controlled state, Araf.1t had to do1ninate these internal leaders.67 
Coming fro1n the diaspora, Arafat needed son1e basis for his leadership, and 
he found this in the same social base as the Jordanian monarchy: the old 
landed elite families or notables who had been marginalized by the demo-
cratic Intifada.68 Arafat's entourage \Vere vie\ved as outsiders. Con1ing from 
l ~; 
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Tunisia, they \Vere tcrn1ed the "Tunisians." The decision to base his rule on 
the old upper class was consequential, since the lack of social mobility has 
been a frequent cornplaint of the Islan1ists. Indeed, the n1ain Islan1ist social 
base is a1nong those rising stars, would-be leaders butting up against the lack 
of 1neritocracy. 
Further opposed to the Intifada's den1ocratic and n1eritocratic structure 
was the revival of the influence of extended ta111ilies, tribal la\v, and notables 
in support of Arafat's administration. As is true of resurrections in gener~1l, the 
ne\vly revived family \Vas not the san1e as the older version, but its place in the 
social structure and social role \Vas the san1e.69 As Mona Younis den1onstrated 
in her comparison of the revolutionary nationalist n1ove1nents in South Africa 
and the Palestinian territories, tl1e passage from elite to 1nass 111ove1nent is 
necessary for the resistance's overall goals to be met.70 In this case, the 111ass 
movetnent phase \vas the first Intifada. Arat3.t's ho1necon1ing signaled a rever-
sal of the process to a conservative, status~quo social base. In one of the least 
clannish and tribal societies in tlie Arab world, tribalism made a comeback in 
the 1990s. 
Arafat managed to create a system personally dependent on him, in which 
the power brokers and networks of influence and jobs were those closest to 
him. The new president's signature was necessary for everything. Beneath the 
formal structures of den1ocracy lay infor1nal control and patronage networks. 
Control over job provision, increasingly in1portant with the closure imposed 
by Israel, was in the hands of Arafat loyalists. A large portion of employment 
was with the PA: 17 percent of all employment in the West Bank, upward of 
30 percent in the Gaza strip. The new political elite allied with and in many 
cases became part of the economic elite. Holders of VIP cards were able to 
pass Israeli checkpoints during closure, providing thern a co1nparative advan-
tage economically. 71 
In order for the PA to folfill its side of the Oslo bargain, a large security 
force \Vas needed. As n1entioned earlier, the Palestinian police forces \Vere 
one of the only concrete institutions stipulated by Oslo. Shortly after Oslo, 
40,000 police and intelligence ofticers operated among the small West 
Bank and Gaza strip population of around three million people. These 
forces were heavily staffed by foreign-based Palestinians, in addition to 
Fatah loyalists or the Tanzim (the Organization). The latter were internal 
PLO activists, somewhat hesitantly embraced by Arafat. They proved diffi-
cult to control and of dubious loyalty to tho PA. They became active dur-
ing the second Intifada, against the wishes of the PA, fighting Israeli 
military forces during their incursions into the West Bank and targeting 
1nilitary posts.72 
Arafat attempted to maintain control of these forces by borrowing a page 
fro1n Machiavellian and colonialist tactics. He created nun1crous security and 
intelligence forces (fron1 between seven and nine in 1995 to eleven security 
services during the second Intifada), intentionally fragn1ented, \vith overlap-
ping and vaguely specified boundaries. 73 Sorne groups monitored others, but 
ultimately, they were all supposed to be directly responsible to Arafat. 74 
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Meanwhile, the indigenous Intitada-era leadership '~hlS bypassed. Faced 
\Vi th the reality of their 111arginalization and increasing power in the hands of 
Arafat loyalists, the domestic-based leadership was divided between several 
forms of retreat from the new PA system. Some accommodated themselves 
and attempted to integrate into the syste1n, particularly Fatah members. Many 
were co-opted, often in the logical pursuit of employment. Other leaders of 
civil society organizations, unions, \vomen 's organizations, committees, and 
professional associations were integrated into the PA's governing structure.75 
Much of the nonreligious opposition, the left, democrats and intellectuals 
\vho \Vere un\villing to participate in the nonde1nocratic PA, retreated into 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). They were easily marginalized 
through threats of imprisonn1ent, harass1nent, and threats to their funding. 
Desiring to do good works, and dependent on external financing from the 
West channeled through the PA's Ministry of the Interior, the secular oppo-
sition was effectively removed from politics and fragmented among multiple 
NGOs. The perceived elite character of these NGOs further divided this lead-
ership from the grass roots of the first Intifada. Arafat's government had con-
trol over all the aid money coming into the territories, from government to 
the PA.76 These associations, far from the hopes put upon them by the West 
as emerging centers of resistance to the state and watchdogs for democracy, 
have been unable to accomplish any of these goals. They did not even try, 
apart fron1 mobilization to resist i1nposition of laws based on Egypt's version 
of NGO control. 
By contrast to the incapacity of the secular opposition, religious opposi-
tion was independent of Western and PA financing. Their funds were from 
alternative sources, such as almsgiving and charitable donations. Vacated by 
the secular groups, the field of protest and activism became dominated by the 
religious groups. The PA dealt with these through alternative means. 
PA-Islamist relations deteriorated, progressively, from an understanding to 
avoid conflict, to in1prisonn1ents and raids on Islamist organizations. 
Originally hopeful that it could participate in the PA's government, Hamas 
became aware that the PA intended to stick by its agreement in Oslo, stipu-
lating that all forms of dissent be stamped out.77 In fact, progress in Oslo's 
planned redeployments was conditional upon Israel's security concerns. Since 
the PA's legitimacy was based on Oslo and continued progress toward Oslo's 
goals, the PA was obligated (and Arafat had agreed) to enforce Israel's ver-
sion of security. Even if it had desired to allow participation of the Islamist 
groups in the govern1nent, Oslo would prevent it. 
As part of the Oslo accords, the PA was charged with stamping out Hamas 
and all voices of protest. It did so. Waves of arrests took place of suspected 
opposition n1e1nbers. Within a tew years, there were 17 PA prisons in Gaza.78 
PA clashes with Hamas resulted in deaths of the latter. After each attack, the 
PA conducted roundups of suspected militants. In 1996, it raided social serv-
ice and educational institutions, and even rnosques.79 In 1997, after hun-
dreds of arrests, the PA closed 16 religious-rnn charities and commandeered 
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Ha1nas and the PA came to an agreement at the start ofOslo.81 Realizing 
the popularity of the Oslo accords, Hamas had to align itself with public 
opinion and agreed not to fight the PA or do anything to hinder Oslo. The 
group desired to be part of the governing process, and contemplated form-
ing a separate political party for that purpose, a development parallel to that 
of the Sinn Fein and IRA that led to the eventual end of the conflict thcre.82 
Numerous analyses of Han1as have detailed the n1oven1cnt's prJ.gmatisn1 
over idealism, its doctrinal flexibility, and the essential retaliatory logic of mil-
itary attacks.83 The n1ovement is nationalistic, and only n1arginally concerned 
with religious edicts, unlike Islamist moven1ents in other countries.84 Leaders 
repeatedly proclaimed their desire to be part of the political process. The use 
of violence was "controlled" in order to prevent jeopardizing the continued 
existence of its social service organizations, initiate direct confrontation '\iVith 
the PA, or lose the support of popular opinion.85 What Hamas is fundamen-
tally after is an alteration of the terms of Oslo and a larger role in the politi-
cal process within the PA itself 
What is crucial is the relationship between Hamas' leadership and the 
actions of its following. The structure ofHamas has, essentially, been decen-
tralized, but with a legitimate and authoritative leadership able to speak for 
the membership and obtain their allegiance to central decisions. Due to the 
decentralized nature of the organization, and the lack of direct comn1unica-
tion between the branches, the decisions are announced publicly. 86 The polit-
ical leadership of the Islamic resistance issued decrees to either halt or initiate 
action, which were then enacted by the military wing. Waves of military 
actions by Hamas against civilians, occurred in response to specific events, 
such as the Hebron massacre of Palestinian worshippers in February 1994, 
and mass arrests or repression by the PA and Israel periodically through the 
Oslo years.87 Truces or ''hudJ1a" have been called at different points in titne, 
ceasing military actions. This first occurred after Oslo, from September 1994 
to Febrnary 1996, as per the Islamist resistance's agreement with the PA.88 
This ended with Israel's assassination ofYahya Ayyash in January 1996, trig-
gering a number of suicide bombings. Arrests and roundups of suspected 
activists by the PA and harsh repression of the organization followed. 
As the Oslo regime wore on, the Palestinian population Jost progressively 
more public space and tights, due both to enforcements by Israel and the PA. 
Israeli settlements and land confiscations ofWest Bank territory continued and 
the economic isolation of the Palestinian t~_rritories and their dependence on 
Israel increased. Oslo provided for the increasing isolation into small cantons 
and the PA denied them a political voice. The public spaces that did open np 
were ones of confrontation: checkpoints and border crossings, fron1 one zone 
to another. 89 The tin1e consun1ed in these activities, along with the humiliation 
they entailed, fi.1eled existing claims of injustice. As one observer noted, a 1najor 
consequence has been the "theft of time" and the inability to tnake plans, even 
for work.9° Criticism of the PA began even fi·on1 \vithin, frotn Fatah and the 
Tanzim. Marwan Barghouti is the fuce of this den1ocratic criticisrn. Further, the 
international political process of negotiations '\ivas seriously stalled. 
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Second Intifada 
Seven years after the handshake on the White House lawn inaugurating 
the Oslo accords the condition of the Palestinians had worsened and laid 
the groundwork' for a violent 1novement by sn1all nun1bers of activ~sts. 
Paradoxically, although control of some areas had passed from Israeli to 
Palestinian hands, Oslo created sweeping changes in the geography of _the 
West Bank and Gaza, parceling the territories with crisscrossed checkpomts 
of control. Israeli settlements increased by over 50 percent during those 
seven years, and the settler population almost doubled.91 
The second Intifada began the day after Ariel Sharon's visit to the Dome 
of the Rock or al-Aqsa mosque in late September 2000. Palestinian demon-
strators and worshipers were fired upon, sparking an uprising. In contrast to 
conditions during tlle first Intifada, tlle masses were now marginalized, leav-
ing the field of resistance to small groups of activists. 
Fatah and the Tanzim were at the forefront of this uprising. They made up 
the internal leadership, those who had lived through tlle first Intifada. From 
tlle start of Oslo, their adherence to PA authority had been conditional. This 
made the disintegration of movement autl1ority in the absence of its leader-
ship more pronounced. Although Arafat did not order the al-Aqsa uprising, 
he did not act forcefully to halt it in the initial period. His low approval rat-
ing, scoring only about 011e-quarter of the population at that tin1e, led ana-
lysts to conclude that any decision to counter the Intifada on his part would 
have been ignored and his leadership jeopardized.92 
During the first two years of this Intifada, Israel assassinated over 100 
political activists, both religious and secular.93 During the reoccupa~on of 
West Bank towns in spring 2002, much of Fatah's mid-level leadership was 
eliminated. The leadership vacuum was filled by young men increasingly 
autonomous of any hierarchy or control. Loosely, they are collectively known 
as al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, but other names have been coined for some, 
including Battalions of the Return and Jenin Martyr's Briga_de. '.""en the 
phenomenon first developed., it was interpreted. through an elite bias. These 
new "splinter" groups were assu1ned to be taking orders fron1 leaders 
abroad.94 Later it became clear that groups were acting on their own. The PA 
leadership increasingly complained about them, calling tllem gangs, "armed 
n1en," thugs, or mafias. 9:; 
The 1ise oflocalized. and independent power centers, divorced from national 
authorities, is clear from the events of the last few years, particularly in tlle 
northern area, including Nablns, Jenin, Qalquiliyya, and Tulkaram. Truces 
accepted by other opposition groups, including the Islamists, have_ been 
ignored and violated by the Brigade.96 Decisions by the Fatal1 Revolutionary 
Council could not be enforced. The popular resistance comn1ittces refused 
Araf:1t's order for them to dissolve.97 Independent n1ilitary actions were con-
ducted, including the assassination of collaborators and recruiting children for 
suicide bon1bings, \Vithout the approval or k.i10\vledgc of the Brigade leader.98 
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Justice, in The Hague, on the legitimacy of the separation \V~\ll, one of these 
groups carried out a bombir1g.99 
PA otlicials have become targets of these groups. For example, the PA's 
interior n1itlister was threatened in Nablus. 100 Further, that to\vn's governor's 
cars were set on fire and his brother kid.napped-'°1 The Gaza police chief was 
kid.napped.. In Jenin, the governor was kidnapped and beaten pu?licly, 
accused of corruption, and his successor's office raided. The hon1e of a PA 
police ofilcer \vas set on fire, while 100 other policen1cn w~rc across ~he 
street. 102 Individuals close to Arafat have been attacked, killed, or kid.-
napped..103 Otlices and journalists have also been attacked. Most recently, 
Mahmud Abbas was fired upon in Arafat's mourning tent by individuals call-
ing themselves the Abu Ammar (Arafat's nom de guerre) brigades. 104 In Gaza, 
tlle rift between Arafat's nephew and choice for governor (Musa Arafat) and 
Muhammad. Dahlan has seen much ofFatah siding with the latter, explicitly 
attacking President Arafat and his orders. 105 The motive, according to PA 
observers, is to solidify the leadership positions of the actors, and force 
. A 1 d. l . d. l' . io• changes 111 the P ea ers up an po 1c1es. . . 
This dynamic of fragmentation is illustrated. in the Brigade lead.er of Jemn, 
Zakariya Zubeidi. Although he began as a peace activist, he is now known as 
the unotlicial mayor of Jenin. 107 He is independent of PA authority, and his 
group has attacked and kidnapped. PA otlicials and their otlices on numerous 
occasions. One governor 'vas given a public heating for his alleged corrup-
tion.108 The use of violence in consolidating the chain of leadership is clear. 
Two days after assuming the reigns of authority, he authorized a suicide 
bombing in Israel. Since then, he has not authorized any suicide bomb-
ings.109 Otl1er groups tried to join his, exemplifying the stakes of these power 
struggles. The lead.er ofFatah in Jenin decided to join his group to Zubeid.i's, 
which won him the ire of Arafat and landed him in prison. 110 
Whereas Islamist actions get all the press, the Israelis held the secular 
Tanzim and Fatah branches as responsible for half of all attacks on Israelis in 
2002.111 Previously, it had followed. the PA's orders, battling against the 
Islamists and suppressing them. Now many branches of (nominally) Fatah 
members join the Islamic opposition. In fact, as of 2004, Israeli press 
reported that these groups were a larger security threat than Hamas. 112 
NabJus, in particular, is seen as a prime source of suicide bon1bers. Han1as 
and Islamic Jihad, for the most part, are viewed as disciplined and trustwor-
thy by con1parison, remaining alooffi.·om the "turf wars" going on around 
them. 113 It is Hamas that is heading the electoral registration drive, attempt-
. h . d. . . 1 "' ing to convince the populace to exercise t e1r en1ocrat1c rig 1ts. . 
Particularly since the assassination of the Hamas lead.er Shaykh Yas111 and 
then Abd. al-Aziz Rantisi, fragmentation has been observed in Hamas in the 
West Bank, but still less than that in Fatah or Islamic Jihad. In Gaza, Hamas 
is the 1nost centralized. Although the leadership assassinations \Vere 1neant to 
deter the formation of a "Han1asland" in Gaza, Han1as is n1ore solidified 
there than previously. 115 
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
What causes nlovements to use violence) and under what circun1stances can 
they be induced to abandon such methods? What tactics should be used to 
battle a violent nationalist insurgency with grass roots support? In many cases, 
an inaccurate appraisal of the phenomenon has resulted in policy prescriptions 
that have exacerbated, not solved, the problem. One of the most violent, 
ongoing, national-based conflicts with Isla1nism today is in the occupied 
Palestinian territories. The Oslo process expressly provided the elements for 
the future militatization of the opposition to the PA. Oslo exacerbated the 
underlying issues in the Palestinian conflict, while at the same ti1ne pushing 
the decentralization of the resistance. 
Oslo embodies Israel's tactical strategies for battling the opposition move-
ment. Identical strategies are being utilized in the current U.S. battle with Iraqi 
insurgents. If intended to moderate violent opposition, the premises oflsraeli 
interaction have proven inaccurate. The intent of the Oslo accords is a second-
ary and less pressing conclusion arising fron1 this study. The more in1portant 
implication of this analysis is the effect of increasing tl1e decentralization of a 
movement and fragn1enting it, the use of collective punishtnent, prevention of 
any political role, and eliminating the movement's leadership. 
This study showed that resistance n1ovements cannot be characterized by a 
broad brush, as either violent or not. The use of violence can be calculated or 
tl1e result of internal organizational factors, such as the quest to establish lead-
ership or compete with other factions of tl1e movement. Collective punish-
n1ent or indiscritninate repression provides increased support for opposition 
activities and justifies the use of violence against an unjust oppressor. When 
any individual, guilty or not, young or elderly, can be the object of military or 
police reprisals, a backlash occurs and creates Inore resistance. 
Just as violent actions can be the result of tactical and organizational 
concerns, rather than essential ideologies of the 1nove1nent, so too can see1n-
ingly neutral processes of institutionalization moderate the n1ovement. 
Movements do pay attention to tl1eir public's opinion. Formal organization 
and hierarchy create structures of accountability to the comtnunity and 
multiple classes, which approve the use of violence much less than under-
ground, exclusive groups. 
The repeated insistence on seeing insurgencies as coordinated, hierarchical 
movements has clouded the policy options for both the United States and 
Israel, and has enflamed the militarization of the conflicts. Leaving the lead-
ership in place provides a negotiating partner with the ability to comn1and 
allegiance to whatever deal that leader negotiates. Removing the leader does 
not increase the chances of peace, but tnerely transfers the resistance to 
uncontrollable underground and uncoordinated groups. When the underly-
ing causes of the n1oven1ent still exist, such as collective punishment, lack of 
political voice, population control, and huiniliation, a violent spiral \vill be 
created. Both history and social science have shown that to formulate policy 
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Too often, the fundatnental reality of an insurgency Vl.'ith grass roots appeal, 
not lticrarchically controlled, has not been ackno\vledged. Eli1ninating leaders 
in this situation will prolong and deepen the contlict. 
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Barak A. Salmoni 
At the end of the twentieth century, observers of the Middle East worked 
to define the paran1eters, reach, and trajectory of Isla1nization. Particularly 
after 9 /11, policymakers and analysts redoubled efforts to gauge the extent 
oflslamization's current and future progress and to grasp its implications for 
American interests. The American political-military policy conununity has 
also publicly and analytically worked to disaggregate the seemingly monolithic 
Islamist threat into two can1ps: those \vhosc interests are inin1ical to 
American interests and those \Vhose attitudes toward the United States do 
not go beyond mild antipathy or ambivalence. 1 
These are no doubt important n1atters. The nature of religious debate, 
and its impact on n1ass ideological proclivities and state policies of interest to 
America, are of deep concern to the United States. Although an internal mat-
ter, An1erican power and diplon1acy cannot forego engagen1ent \Vith trends 
possessing transnational potential in favor of an abstract, sterile notion of 
nonintervention in other countries' affairs. It is in1portant to grasp the dif-
ferential meanings of Islamization in various geographical environn1ents and 
an1ong diverse econon1ic and intellectual strata.2 No less important is the 
debate over \Vhether n1oderate Islamists are moderate in filct-whether they 
are auto-refornllng-or \vhether moderate tactics and democratic rhetoric 
conceal goals no less authoritarian and sociopolitically intrusive as those of 
the Middle East's current authoritarian, aging, and decidedly secular 
regin1es. 3 
This chapter begins \.Vith a broader reflection on Islan1ization in the 
twenty-first century Middle East. For purposes of this discussion, the term re-
Islamization is preferable to Islan1ization. Such se1nantic nlodification signals a 
substantive conviction. Rather than identifying the sociopolitical, cultural, 
and discursive prominence oflslan1 as breaking a pattern or presenting a new, 
divergent phenomenon \vi thin the nantral teleology of 111odcrnity, it has been 
secularisn1 that has presented the break. This interruption is best vie\.ved as a 
